1.31 Alternative Business Objectives and the Principal-Agent Problem: 30-minute Pack

AQA 7136 · Calculators not allowed · about 30 minutes

Total Marks

Name: _____ Date: ____ / ____ / _____

Answer all questions. Write full sentences for the scenario question and the extended evaluate question.

1 Evaluate the view that shareholders can fully control managerial behaviour in large public limited companies.

(Total for Question 1 is 15 marks)

2 Satisficing behaviour by managers: define satisficing in the context of a public limited company and give one reason a manager might satisfice rather than maximise profit.

(Total for Question 2 is 2 marks)

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3 Non-profit objectives: explain why some managers may prioritise firm growth or organisational size even when profits could be higher at a smaller scale, naming one internal incentive that supports this choice.

(Total for Question 3 is 2 marks)

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4 Scenario: A UK supermarket chain, Greenfield Grocers, sets a policy that store managers receive promotion and store-incentive pay based strictly on the number of transactions per month and on market share in each town. Greenfield also deliberately reduces some product prices below competitors to attract customers, accepting thinner margins. Identify which alternative objective Greenfield is most likely pursuing and explain, in one paragraph, whether Greenfield's chosen output level is likely to be above or below the profit-maximising output level. Explain your reasoning.

(Total for Question 4 is 3 marks)

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Mark scheme · 1.31 Alternative Business Objectives and the Principal-Agent Problem: 30-minute Pack

Question 1

Level 1 Basic statements about shareholder attempts to control managers with limited development. May describe one or two mechanisms such as monitoring or pay, with little analysis of their effectiveness or limitations. **1-5**

Level 2 Clear explanation of several mechanisms shareholders use to influence managers, such as executive pay, board oversight, shareholder votes and takeover threat, with analysis of how these can align interests and some consideration of agency costs and practical limits. **6-10**

Level 3 A well-developed balanced evaluation that weighs evidence for and against the claim shareholders can fully control managers, discusses why control is often partial (monitoring costs, information asymmetry, short-termism from incentives, collective action problems), considers regulatory and market discipline, and reaches a supported judgement. **11-15**

Indicative content:

- Mechanisms by which shareholders attempt control: appointing and dismissing boards, AGM votes, executive pay tied to performance, activist shareholders, takeover threat and market for corporate control, disclosure and reporting requirements.
- Ways these mechanisms can succeed: performance-related pay aligns incentives, active monitoring by institutional investors can influence strategy, takeover threat disciplines underperformance, legal/regulatory duties of directors constrain opportunism.
- Limitations and reasons control is incomplete: dispersed ownership causes collective action problems and weak monitoring incentives, information asymmetry leaves managers with informational advantage, monitoring and contracting are costly leading to agency costs, incentives can create perverse outcomes like short-termism or risk-shifting.
- Empirical and practical points: institutional investors vary in activism; regulatory changes can increase transparency but cannot remove asymmetric information; boards may be captured or lack independence.
- Evaluation angles: magnitude and time frame matter, complete control may be infeasible but partial alignment can be achieved; trade-offs between tight control and managerial autonomy for long-term strategy; supported judgement on whether 'fully control' is realistic given costs and governance mechanisms.

Question 2

definition: satisficing is choosing an outcome that is acceptable or good enough to meet multiple stakeholders objectives rather than the single goal of profit maximisation **B1**

reason: managers may satisfice because they value job security, a stable predictable income, and avoiding the risk and effort required to chase maximum profit **B1**

Answer: Satisficing is settling for an acceptable level of performance across several objectives rather than maximising profit, often chosen because managers prefer job security and lower risk.

Question 3

reason: growth can increase managers influence, job security and perceived success, and larger firms may offer higher prestige and personal benefits to managers **B1**

internal incentive: bonuses or career progression linked to growth or market share rather than to profit alone **B1**

Answer: Managers may prioritise growth for greater influence, job security and prestige; internal incentives include bonuses or promotion tied to market share or turnover growth.

Question 4

identifies sales volume maximisation (maximising units or number of transactions) as the objective, supported by incentives tied to transactions and market share **B1**

explains direction of output: output is likely to be above the profit-maximising level because managers accept lower prices to increase transactions and market share **B1**

links reasoning: lower prices to attract more customers increase quantity sold but reduce per-unit margin, so the firm operates at higher output than the profit-maximising point where MR=MC **B1**

Answer: Greenfield is pursuing sales volume maximisation; its output is likely above the profit-maximising level because managers accept lower prices to increase transactions and market share, raising quantity sold while reducing margins.

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