1.32 Transfer Earnings and Economic Rent in Factor Markets: 30-minute Pack

AQA 7136 · Calculators not allowed · about 30 minutes

Total Marks

Name: _____ Date: ____ / ____ / _____

Answer all questions. Short answers may be brief phrases; the final 12-mark question requires full sentences. No calculator is needed.

1 Analyse why consultant orthopaedic surgeons in a large UK city might earn a large amount of economic rent compared with general hospital porters. Your answer should include a diagram showing supply and demand for surgeons, explanation of factors affecting transfer earnings and economic rent, consideration of counterarguments and a supported judgement.

(Total for Question 1 is 12 marks)

2 Explain why a low-skilled, easily trained occupation in a UK city, such as entry-level retail assistants, tends to have most of its payment classified as transfer earnings rather than economic rent.

(Total for Question 2 is 3 marks)

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3 Calculation: In a specialist UK consultancy a highly trained analyst requires at least £28,000 per year to remain in the job (their reservation wage). The market pays £72,000. Calculate the analyst's economic rent per year and state the units.

(Total for Question 3 is 4 marks)

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4 Explain briefly what happens to economic rent for a group of workers if a sudden large number of equally qualified substitutes enter the UK labour market for their occupation.

(Total for Question 4 is 3 marks)

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Mark scheme · 1.32 Transfer Earnings and Economic Rent in Factor Markets: 30-minute Pack

Question 1

Level 1 Basic identification of relevant concepts with limited development. May draw an undeveloped diagram or state that surgeons earn more due to training. Limited linkage between supply elasticity, scarcity and rent, and little or no evaluation or judgement. **1-4**

Level 2 Clear explanation of how inelastic supply, long training, licensing and high demand for specialist skills create a large economic rent for surgeons. Includes a correctly labelled supply and demand diagram showing a high wage and shaded rent. Some analysis of transfer earnings versus rent and at least one evaluative point such as time lags or substitutes reducing rent, but judgement may be only partially supported. **5-8**

Level 3 Comprehensive analysis with a well-labelled diagram and correct shading of transfer earnings and economic rent. Develops multiple reasons: long training and licensing, unique skills, geographic agglomeration, high willingness to pay by hospitals/private sector, and market power in specialist posts. Considers counterarguments including public sector pay caps, bargaining, and potential supply expansion over the long run, and discusses magnitude, time horizon and distributional effects. Ends with a supported judgement on why surgeons earn substantial economic rent relative to porters. **9-12**

Indicative content:

- diagram: upward-sloping supply for surgeons (inelastic in short run) and downward-sloping demand intersecting at high We; transfer earnings shown as area under supply up to a lower reservation level, economic rent as area between We and supply above it to Qe
- supply-side reasons: long and costly training, professional licensing, limited training places, credentialing and certification creating high barriers to entry
- demand-side reasons: high willingness to pay by hospitals and private clinics for specialist skills, ageing population increasing demand for orthopaedic services, ability to generate revenue via private practice
- inelastic short-run supply means wage rises largely translate into economic rent rather than increased quantity supplied
- transfer earnings for surgeons are still high due to opportunity costs and long training, but the surplus above that minimum is large because of scarcity and high demand
- counterarguments: public pay bargaining and national contracts can limit wages, training expansion and international recruitment could increase supply and reduce rent over time, and some pay reflects compensating differentials for long hours and risk rather than pure scarcity
- distributional and efficiency considerations: economic rent accrues to the worker and may not increase social welfare; policies to tax or capture rent, or to expand training capacity, can alter the split between transfer earnings and rent
- conclude with a reasoned judgement on balance, noting the importance of time horizon and institutional constraints

Question 2

state that supply of low-skilled retail labour is relatively elastic because workers can be trained quickly and many workers are available **M1**

explain that when supply is elastic, any above-minimum wage is competed away by new entrants, so wages mostly reflect transfer earnings **A1**

link to example: firms facing a slightly higher wage attract more applicants, reducing the scope for sustained economic rent **A1**

Answer: Elastic supply of low-skilled retail workers means wages are driven toward the minimum needed to keep people in the job, so payments are mainly transfer earnings.

Question 3

method: economic rent = market wage - transfer earnings (reservation wage) **M1**

calculation shown: 72,000 - 28,000 **A1**

answer: £44,000 **A1**

unit stated: GBP per year **B1**

Answer: Economic rent = £44,000 per year.

Question 4

identify that supply becomes more elastic or shifts right with many substitutes entering **M1**

explain that increased supply reduces the market wage toward the reservation wage for many workers **A1**

conclude that economic rent falls, perhaps to near zero for marginal workers, as wages are competed down **A1**

Answer: With many substitutes supply becomes more elastic and wages fall toward reservation levels, so economic rent is reduced or eliminated for many workers.

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