6.3 Global Governance: Political and Economic: 30-minute Pack

EDEXCEL 9PL0 · about 30 minutes

Total Marks

Name: _____ Date: ____ / ____ / _____

Answer all questions. Question 1 is a 30-mark AO1/AO2/AO3 essay. This is a topic practice pack for Component 3B Global Politics, not a full examination paper.

1 Evaluate the view that reform of political and economic global governance can substantially improve its effectiveness in tackling conflict and poverty. Use dated examples and compare the case for reform with arguments about state interests, unequal power and the limits of institutional change.

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(Total for Question 1 is 30 marks)

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Mark scheme · 6.3 Global Governance: Political and Economic: 30-minute Pack

Question 1

Level 0 No relevant material.	**0**
Level 1 Limited relevant knowledge; assertions dominate and any judgement has little support.	**1-6**
Level 2 Some relevant institutional knowledge with simple explanations; competing arguments receive limited examination.	**7-12**
Level 3 Generally accurate knowledge supports developed analysis of reform and constraints, with some evaluation and a partly supported judgement.	**13-18**
Level 4 Detailed evidence sustains analysis of competing arguments; evaluation weighs the significance of reforms and constraints and supports a clear judgement.	**19-24**
Level 5 Precise, well-selected evidence supports sustained analysis and critical evaluation of competing arguments about conflict and poverty, reaching a substantiated judgement. Any defensible conclusion can earn full marks.	**25-30**

Indicative content:

- Effectiveness can be assessed through capacity to reach decisions, implementation, reduced conflict and improvements in poverty and living conditions. Representation or agreement alone is an intermediate achievement.
- Case for substantial reform: The UN established in 1945 offers a continuing forum, but its Security Council structure and veto can obstruct collective responses. More representative membership or restraint in veto use could improve legitimacy and willingness to cooperate. Reform can also make agreement harder if it adds competing interests.
- Counterargument: A realist account expects powerful states to defend their interests. Altering seats or procedures may not supply political agreement, resources or national implementation. Yet repeated institutional interaction can still reduce uncertainty, as liberal accounts suggest.
- NATO, founded in 1949, illustrates a military alliance with a collective defence purpose rather than universal membership. Its post-Cold War role raises questions about adapting security cooperation. Military capacity and coordination can help agreed goals, while selective membership and differing national priorities limit universal conflict management. Neither its existence nor its adaptation establishes success in every conflict.
- Case for economic reform: IMF stabilisation finance and World Bank development finance can meet different needs. Criticism of SAPs concerns distributional harm and restricted policy autonomy. PRSPs seek greater country ownership and poverty focus; participation and transparent monitoring could improve the fit between finance and local needs.
- Counterargument on poverty: PRSP consultation need not transfer control to affected people. Debt burdens, global economic conditions, domestic inequalities and unequal lender influence may constrain outcomes even with better procedures. Stabilisation can protect development spending over time, while rapid adjustment can undermine services; outcomes require evidence.
- The G20 was created in 1999 and engaged with the 2008 economic downturn. These dated developments show a forum responding to collective economic problems; they do not establish how much recovery it caused. G7 and G20 coordination can support action through members, but neither forum has a formal mechanism to impose its decisions.
- WTO rules and dispute settlement can make cooperation more predictable; unequal capacity and bargaining power can limit gains for poorer members. Neo-classical arguments favour opening markets, while dependency and world-systems accounts question the distribution of gains within an unequal global economy.
- Global civil society can contribute delivery, monitoring and local knowledge. ECOSOC provides a UN setting for economic and social cooperation. NGO participation can improve information and accountability, while funding dependence and unequal representation can limit whose interests reforms reflect.
- Income poverty measures allow comparisons only with appropriate definitions and prices; multidimensional approaches add health, education and living standards. Growth or a falling poverty rate alone does not prove that institutional reform caused development.
- A supported judgement may find substantial gains plausible where reforms improve representation, information and policy ownership and states provide resources. An equally strong alternative may find reforms mainly incremental because veto interests, unequal economic power and implementation constraints dominate. A differentiated judgement may find reform more effective for poverty programmes than coercive conflict management, or the reverse with evidence.
- Indicative content is non-exhaustive. Credit accurate dated evidence, defensible alternative arguments and any substantiated conclusion. Do not require agreement with a preferred judgement or all the examples listed here.

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