6.3 Global Governance: Political and Economic

EDEXCEL 9PL0 · about 60 minutes · Write-in edition

Total Marks

Name: _____ Date: ____ / ____ / _____

Answer all questions. Question 5 is a 12-mark AO1/AO2 analysis. Question 6 is a 30-mark AO1/AO2/AO3 essay. This is a topic practice pack for Component 3B Global Politics, not a full examination paper.

1 Explain one difference between the economic roles of the IMF and the World Bank, and one way either can influence a borrowing government.

(Total for Question 1 is 3 marks)

2 A fictional classroom summit exercise, dated October 2026, gives a G7 meeting a pledge to support emergency food imports. Two participating governments fund deliveries; another delays its contribution. Explain one route by which the pledge could help and one limit on treating it as an enforceable instruction. No real summit statement is quoted.

(Total for Question 2 is 4 marks)

3 A fictional development exercise compares a loan programme requiring rapid spending cuts and trade liberalisation with a poverty strategy prepared through consultations with local organisations. Explain one rationale and one possible drawback of the first approach, then one intended improvement and one continuing limitation of the second. Relate your answer to SAPs and PRSPs.

(Total for Question 3 is 4 marks)

4 A fictional aid review, dated October 2026, invites NGOs to report on whether financed clinics reach remote communities. Officials publish the reports but retain control of loan decisions. Explain one potential strength and one limitation of this civil society role, and identify one institutional reform that could address a limitation.

(Total for Question 4 is 5 marks)

5 Analyse how institutional design can both enable and restrict global political and economic cooperation. Use this original October 2026 classroom briefing and your own knowledge. The UN Security Council has primary responsibility for international peace and security, but a permanent member can veto a substantive resolution. In the exercise, a permanent member blocks a proposed response to a conflict. Separately, a G20 meeting coordinates national economic recovery pledges, but the forum has no formal mechanism to impose its decisions on members. In the exercise, several governments implement their pledges while another postpones action. These events are fictional; the institutional descriptions are factual. No institutional statement is quoted.

(Total for Question 5 is 12 marks)

6 Evaluate the view that reform of political and economic global governance can substantially improve its effectiveness in tackling conflict and poverty. Use dated examples and compare the case for reform with arguments about state interests, unequal power and the limits of institutional change.

(Total for Question 6 is 30 marks)

Mark scheme · 6.3 Global Governance: Political and Economic

Question 1

Identifies one accurate difference between the economic roles of the IMF and World Bank, such as financial stabilisation compared with longer-term development. **B1**

Explains that contrast by accurately linking both institutions to their roles: for example, IMF balance-of-payments lending compared with World Bank finance for development and poverty reduction. Credit any accurate role comparison, not only this example. **B1**

Explains one influence on a borrower, such as linking access to finance to agreed policy reforms through loan conditions; accept another accurate mechanism. **B1**

Answer: The IMF focuses on monetary and financial stability, including balance-of-payments lending, whereas the World Bank supports longer-term development and poverty reduction. Conditions on access to finance can influence the reforms a borrowing government adopts.

Question 2

Identifies one route by which the pledge could help, such as coordinating national resources for emergency food imports; accept another valid route grounded in the exercise. **B1**

Explains how that route could help: for example, the two funded deliveries contribute to food provision, or coordination can bring resources together to meet import needs. The printed deliveries are one possible illustration, not a compulsory example. **B1**

Identifies one limit on enforceability, such as the G7 having no formal mechanism to impose decisions or participating governments retaining control of contributions; accept another accurate limit. **B1**

Explains why that limit prevents the pledge guaranteeing action: for example, the delayed contribution shows reliance on national follow-through. Credit equivalent explanations; delivery by some governments still counts as partial achievement. **B1**

Answer: The pledge can coordinate national resources around emergency food imports. The two funded deliveries show a practical contribution to implementation in this exercise. The G7 has no formal mechanism to impose its decisions on participating states. The delayed contribution shows reliance on national follow-through; delivery by some governments still counts as partial achievement.

Question 3

Explains one rationale for SAP-style adjustment: spending restraint can stabilise public finances, or trade liberalisation can improve competition and market incentives. Credit another valid rationale linked to the first approach. **B1**

Explains one possible SAP drawback: rapid spending cuts can damage services or burden poorer households, or rapid trade liberalisation can expose domestic producers to competition and cause unemployment. Credit another valid drawback linked to the first approach. **B1**

Explains one intended PRSP improvement: participation in a country-led poverty strategy can improve local ownership or reflect local priorities. Credit another valid improvement linked to the second approach. **B1**

Explains one continuing PRSP limitation: consultation need not give local groups control because lenders, domestic elites or fiscal constraints can narrow policy choices. Credit another valid continuing limitation. **B1**

Answer: SAP-style spending restraint can stabilise public finances, but rapid trade liberalisation can expose domestic producers to competition and cause unemployment. PRSP participation can improve local ownership by reflecting local priorities, while lender influence can still constrain policy choices.

Question 4

Identifies one potential strength of the civil society role, such as local evidence, scrutiny, representation or public accountability; credit another valid strength grounded in the review. **B1**

Explains how the chosen strength could help: for example, published NGO evidence can expose neglected communities and pressure officials to respond, or local knowledge can identify gaps in clinic provision. Credit any valid development of the identified strength. **B1**

Identifies one limitation: officials retain control of lending, or NGO representation and resources may be uneven; accept another accurate limitation. **B1**

Develops the identified limitation: for example, reports can be published without loan allocations changing because officials retain final authority; alternatively, uneven representation may leave some remote communities unheard. **B1**

Identifies one relevant institutional reform, such as a formal response requirement with transparent follow-up, more representative participation, or guaranteed representation for affected communities on the loan decision-making board. Credit any valid reform that could address a limitation; identification is sufficient and no explanation is required. **B1**

Answer: NGOs can supply local evidence about remote communities and published reports can expose delivery gaps. Officials still control lending, so a report may be published without any loan allocation changing. A formal response requirement with transparent follow-up could make it harder to ignore the findings.

Question 5

Level 0 No relevant material. **0**

Level 1 Fragmentary institutional knowledge; links to cooperation are largely asserted. **1-3**

Level 2 Some accurate knowledge of institutional design with a partial explanation of how a rule affects cooperation. **4-6**

Level 3 Accurate, developed explanation links enabling and restricting features to the outcomes in the briefing; analysis is mostly sustained. **7-9**

Level 4 Precise knowledge supports sustained analysis of how design enables and restricts cooperation, distinguishing formal authority, implementation and outcomes. Other valid analytical routes merit full credit. **10-12**

Indicative content:

- AO1: The Security Council has primary peace and security responsibility; the permanent-member veto can block a substantive resolution. The UN was established in 1945. A mandate is not proof of successful conflict resolution.
- AO2 strength: A standing Council offers an organised forum for negotiating collective responses. Permanent-member participation can keep powerful states engaged, making cooperation possible where interests align.
- AO2 limit from the briefing: The printed veto blocks this proposed response despite the institutional mandate. It demonstrates a decision-making obstacle, not proof that all UN activity has stopped.
- AO1/AO2 strength from the briefing: The G20 can coordinate national action without exercising supranational command. Several governments actually implement pledges, which supports a claim of practical cooperation in this exercise.
- AO2 limit from the briefing: The G20 cannot formally impose decisions, and postponement shows the implementation gap. The lack of coercion does not erase the implementation by several governments. The briefing does not specify deliveries of goods or establish the effects on economic recovery.
- The Council example concerns whether a collective decision can be reached; the G20 example concerns national implementation after agreement. Different mechanisms can therefore produce different limits.
- A liberal interpretation can explain the value of recurring forums and coordination; a realist interpretation can explain the veto and selective implementation through state interests. These are analytical interpretations, not facts established solely by the scenarios.
- Indicative content is non-exhaustive. Credit other accurate explanations of both enabling and restricting mechanisms grounded in the printed facts or relevant knowledge. No particular theory or overall verdict is required for this AO1/AO2 analysis.

Question 6

Level 0 No relevant material. **0**

Level 1 Limited relevant knowledge; assertions dominate and any judgement has little support. **1-6**

Level 2 Some relevant institutional knowledge with simple explanations; competing arguments receive limited examination. **7-12**

Level 3 Generally accurate knowledge supports developed analysis of reform and constraints, with some evaluation and a partly supported judgement. **13-18**

Level 4 Detailed evidence sustains analysis of competing arguments; evaluation weighs the significance of reforms and constraints and supports a clear judgement. **19-24**

Level 5 Precise, well-selected evidence supports sustained analysis and critical evaluation of competing arguments about conflict and poverty, reaching a substantiated judgement. Any defensible conclusion can earn full marks. **25-30**

Indicative content:

- Effectiveness can be assessed through capacity to reach decisions, implementation, reduced conflict and improvements in poverty and living conditions. Representation or agreement alone is an intermediate achievement.
- Case for substantial reform: The UN established in 1945 offers a continuing forum, but its Security Council structure and veto can obstruct collective responses. More representative membership or restraint in veto use could improve legitimacy and willingness to cooperate. Reform can also make agreement harder if it adds competing interests.
- Counterargument: A realist account expects powerful states to defend their interests. Altering seats or procedures may not supply political agreement, resources or national implementation. Yet repeated institutional interaction can still reduce uncertainty, as liberal accounts suggest.
- NATO, founded in 1949, illustrates a military alliance with a collective defence purpose rather than universal membership. Its post-Cold War role raises questions about adapting security cooperation. Military capacity and coordination can help agreed goals, while selective membership and differing national priorities limit universal conflict management. Neither its existence nor its adaptation establishes success in every conflict.
- Case for economic reform: IMF stabilisation finance and World Bank development finance can meet different needs. Criticism of SAPs concerns distributional harm and restricted policy autonomy. PRSPs seek greater country ownership and poverty focus; participation and transparent monitoring could improve the fit between finance and local needs.
- Counterargument on poverty: PRSP consultation need not transfer control to affected people. Debt burdens, global economic conditions, domestic inequalities and unequal lender influence may constrain outcomes even with better procedures. Stabilisation can protect development spending over time, while rapid adjustment can undermine services; outcomes require evidence.
- The G20 was created in 1999 and engaged with the 2008 economic downturn. These dated developments show a forum responding to collective economic problems; they do not establish how much recovery it caused. G7 and G20 coordination can support action through members, but neither forum has a formal mechanism to impose its decisions.
- WTO rules and dispute settlement can make cooperation more predictable; unequal capacity and bargaining power can limit gains for poorer members. Neo-classical arguments favour opening markets, while dependency and world-systems accounts question the distribution of gains within an unequal global economy.
- Global civil society can contribute delivery, monitoring and local knowledge. ECOSOC provides a UN setting for economic and social cooperation. NGO participation can improve information and accountability, while funding dependence and unequal representation can limit whose interests reforms reflect.
- Income poverty measures allow comparisons only with appropriate definitions and prices; multidimensional approaches add health, education and living standards. Growth or a falling poverty rate alone does not prove that institutional reform caused development.
- A supported judgement may find substantial gains plausible where reforms improve representation, information and policy ownership and states provide resources. An equally strong alternative may find reforms mainly incremental because veto interests, unequal economic power and implementation constraints dominate. A differentiated judgement may find reform more effective for poverty programmes than coercive conflict management, or the reverse with evidence.
- Indicative content is non-exhaustive. Credit accurate dated evidence, defensible alternative arguments and any substantiated conclusion. Do not require agreement with a preferred judgement or all the examples listed here.