6.4 Global Governance: Human Rights and Environmental

about 60 minutes

Total Marks

Name: _____ Date: ____ / ____ / _____

Edexcel A-Level Politics, Global Politics option. Answer all 12 questions. For extended answers, other accurate, relevant and substantiated arguments can receive full credit. Zero marks where there is no creditworthy response.

1 Explain two limits on the claim that the ICJ and ICC can automatically hear any allegation of international wrongdoing anywhere.

(Total for Question 1 is 4 marks)

2 Explain one way Responsibility to Protect (R2P) challenges sovereignty and one way the 2005 commitment preserves a role for states.

(Total for Question 2 is 4 marks)

3 Explain two differences between shallow-green and deep-green ecology in debates over global environmental governance.

(Total for Question 3 is 4 marks)

4 Explain why an IPCC assessment cannot itself create or enforce a climate treaty, distinguishing the IPCC, UNFCCC and national governments.

(Total for Question 4 is 5 marks)

5 Resource: two original classroom arguments, written for this exercise.
Argument A: Scientific assessment can give governments a shared evidence base. Repeated negotiations and published national plans can make cooperation possible even where no world government exists.
Argument B: Shared evidence does not settle who should bear the costs. Governments can accept collective goals while defending national growth and disputing historical responsibility.

Analyse how the tensions in these arguments help explain both the achievements and limitations of environmental governance. Use the resource and knowledge of Rio, Kyoto and Paris.

(Total for Question 5 is 12 marks)

6 Evaluate the extent to which state sovereignty is the main obstacle to effective global governance of human rights and the environment. Use clearly dated examples and consider alternative explanations.

(Total for Question 6 is 30 marks)

Mark scheme · 6.4 Global Governance: Human Rights and Environmental

Question 1

Identify any one accurate limit on automatic access to either court. Examples include ICJ state-party or consent requirements; ICC limits concerning crimes, time or jurisdictional routes; or ICC admissibility under complementarity. Accept any other valid limit. **B1**

Explain how the first identified limit restricts the claim, for example that an allegation alone cannot establish ICJ contentious jurisdiction without a valid basis of state consent. Accept any accurate development of the chosen limit; particular consent mechanisms are not required. **B1**

Identify any second distinct accurate limit on automatic access to either court, from the examples above or any other valid limit. No particular combination of limits is required. **B1**

Explain how the second identified limit restricts the claim, for example that ordinary offences outside the Rome Statute crime categories cannot automatically be tried by the ICC. Accept any accurate development of the chosen limit; complementarity or jurisdictional triggers need not be discussed unless relevant to that limit. **B1**

Answer: ICJ contentious jurisdiction needs state consent, so an allegation alone cannot establish jurisdiction over an unwilling state. The ICC covers specified international crimes, so ordinary offences outside those categories cannot automatically be tried there.

Question 2

Identify any accurate way R2P challenges an absolute view of sovereignty, for example by qualifying non-interference when authorities manifestly fail to protect populations from atrocity crimes. **B1**

Explain the chosen challenge, for example that collective protection can then be considered despite a government invoking sovereignty. Accept any accurate development. The commitment concerns genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, but listing all four is not required. **B1**

Identify any accurate way the 2005 commitment preserves a state role, such as primary national responsibility for protection or collective decisions through the Security Council in accordance with the UN Charter. **B1**

Explain the chosen state role, for example that international assistance supports national prevention and protection capacity rather than automatically replacing national authorities; alternatively, explain how the Security Council route retains state influence over collective action. Accept any accurate development; both routes are not required. **B1**

Answer: R2P challenges absolute non-interference by envisaging collective action when authorities manifestly fail to protect populations from atrocity crimes. It preserves states' primary protective responsibility: international assistance supports their prevention and protection capacity rather than automatically replacing national authorities.

Question 3

Identify any one accurate difference between shallow-green and deep-green ecology, for example human-centred protection versus intrinsic value for non-human nature. Accept any other valid contrast. **B1**

Explain the first chosen difference, for example that protection justified by human welfare differs from valuing nature independently of its usefulness to people. Accept any accurate development of the chosen contrast. **B1**

Identify any second distinct accurate difference, for example reform compatible with growth versus a challenge to growth-centred consumption. Accept any other valid contrast. **B1**

Explain the second chosen difference, for example that cleaner technology within existing institutions differs from demands for fundamental changes in production and consumption. Accept any accurate development; neither illustrative contrast is compulsory and environmentalists need not fit rigid categories. **B1**

Answer: Shallow-green ecology generally justifies protection through human welfare, while deep-green ecology values non-human nature intrinsically, independently of its usefulness to people. Shallow-green approaches favour reforms compatible with growth, such as cleaner technology; deep-green approaches question growth-centred consumption and may seek fundamental social change.

Question 4

Explain the assessment role: the IPCC assesses published scientific knowledge about climate change to inform policy. Accept equivalent explanations. **B1**

Explain the limit of that role: assessment does not itself create treaty obligations or national legal targets. Accept equivalent explanations; founding dates and founders are not required. **B1**

Distinguish the UNFCCC as the treaty framework within which governments negotiate climate agreements, supported by its secretariat. Accept equivalent explanations; the treaty date is not required. **B1**

Distinguish implementation: governments undertake commitments and implement national policies or domestic mitigation measures. Accept equivalent explanations. **B1**

Explain the enforcement distinction: scientific reports cannot compel emissions reductions; neither the IPCC nor the UNFCCC secretariat enforces national targets as a global police force. Accept equivalent explanations. **B1**

Answer: The IPCC assesses scientific evidence to inform policy; it cannot create treaty obligations. Governments negotiate agreements within the UNFCCC framework, supported by its secretariat. Governments undertake commitments and implement domestic measures. An assessment report cannot itself impose legal obligations or enforce emissions reductions.

Question 5

Level 1 Basic relevant knowledge or reference to the resource, with limited explanation of relationships. **1-3**

Level 2 Some accurate knowledge and resource use; explains at least one relationship between evidence, cooperation and national interests. **4-6**

Level 3 Developed analysis connects both arguments to accurate agreement examples, explaining achievements and limitations. **7-9**

Level 4 Sustained, precise analysis integrates both arguments and substantiated examples, explaining how institutional roles and distributional conflict shape effectiveness. Other valid analytical routes receive equal credit. **10-12**

Indicative content:

- Argument A distinguishes a shared evidence base from political agreement. IPCC assessment informs choices; treaty-making belongs to governments. Credit a clear causal link from common information to reduced uncertainty, without treating the IPCC as a negotiating or enforcement body.
- Rio (1992): the UNFCCC established a climate treaty framework; the Rio Declaration set out principles and Agenda 21 was an action programme, not three interchangeable binding climate treaties. Institutional foundations can outlast disagreement over immediate targets.
- Kyoto Protocol (adopted 11 December 1997): quantified emission commitments for Annex I parties illustrate stronger target differentiation, but their scope was narrower than universal targets. Adoption, ratification and implementation must be distinguished: the United States signed but did not ratify.
- Paris (12 December 2015): successive nationally determined contributions and transparency support participation and scrutiny. The existence of plans does not itself demonstrate sufficient aggregate reductions or successful implementation.
- Argument B: competing accounts of historical emissions, development needs, finance and measurement affect perceived fairness. Common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities can recognise inequality while leaving contested distributions of cost.
- Sustainable development seeks environmental protection alongside development, providing a possible bridge. Deep-green objections question whether growth-centred reforms are adequate; shallow-green approaches regard reform and technology as workable tools.
- Global commons encourage free-riding because benefits of restraint are shared while immediate costs are national. Monitoring can make behaviour visible, but scientific assessment and reporting are distinct from sanctions or coercive enforcement.
- Credit analysis using NGOs: expertise, campaigning and scrutiny can influence negotiations and domestic implementation, but NGOs do not adopt treaties on behalf of states. A list of institutions without causal explanation is insufficient for the highest band.

Question 6

Level 1 Limited relevant knowledge, with assertions and little developed analysis or judgement. **1-6**

Level 2 Some accurate knowledge and explanation; a relevant argument is developed, but evaluation or evidence is limited. **7-12**

Level 3 Accurate knowledge supports developed arguments on both sides, covering human rights and the environment, with some supported evaluation. **13-18**

Level 4 Detailed evidence supports balanced analysis across both areas; weighs sovereignty against alternative explanations and reaches a reasoned judgement. **19-24**

Level 5 Precise, substantiated knowledge supports sustained analysis and evaluation across both areas. Explicitly weighs competing explanations and criteria of effectiveness, addresses counterarguments and reaches a convincing judgement. Any supported conclusion can receive full credit. **25-30**

Indicative content:

- Effectiveness can mean establishing standards, widening participation, providing remedies, changing behaviour or reducing harm. A judgement that distinguishes these criteria is stronger than equating effectiveness with the existence of an institution.
- Sovereignty limits coercion: ICJ contentious jurisdiction rests on state consent, sometimes given in advance. The ICJ determines state responsibility, not individual criminal guilt. Its advisory function must be distinguished from binding judgments between parties in contentious cases.
- Nicaragua v United States, ICJ merits judgment of 27 June 1986, illustrates adjudication of state conduct concerning non-intervention and use of force. Its existence shows law can scrutinise powerful states, but a judgment alone does not demonstrate compliance. Do not infer a conviction or sentence of a US individual.
- ICC jurisdiction and complementarity limit access, while cooperation is needed for arrests and evidence. The Lubanga trial judgment of 14 March 2012 concerned individual responsibility for conscripting and enlisting children under 15 and using them to participate actively in hostilities; it did not convict a state or establish universal jurisdiction.
- European institutions offer a regional route to accountability. Hirst v United Kingdom (No. 2), ECtHR Grand Chamber judgment, 6 October 2005, found the blanket prisoner voting restriction violated Article 3 of Protocol No. 1. It did not grant every prisoner an unconditional vote or imprison ministers. The Council of Europe Committee of Ministers supervises execution; the EU Court of Justice is a different institution.
- R2P, endorsed in the 2005 World Summit Outcome, paragraphs 138-139, qualifies an absolute reading of sovereignty but retains state responsibility and Security Council collective action under the Charter. It covers four atrocity categories, not a general licence to use unilateral force.
- Selective intervention can reflect veto politics, strategic interests, capacity and uncertainty about consequences. Security Council Resolution 1973 (17 March 2011) authorised measures to protect civilians in Libya subject to its terms, including excluding foreign occupation. This is evidence of authorisation, not proof of lasting humanitarian success. Assess claims of Western double standards using comparable criteria and evidence rather than assuming motives.
- For the 1990s, Security Council Resolution 929 (22 June 1994) authorised a temporary multinational operation in Rwanda for humanitarian purposes, while Resolution 955 (8 November 1994) established the ICTR. Delayed protection and retrospective accountability are distinct measures of effectiveness: a tribunal cannot reverse earlier civilian harm. Do not award unsupported claims that intervention invariably succeeds or invariably fails.
- Environmental sovereignty affects ambition and domestic implementation, but consent can also create durable cooperation. Rio (1992) provided the UNFCCC framework; Kyoto (1997) differentiated quantified commitments; Paris (2015) combined broad participation and successive NDCs with nationally determined ambition. Their different designs require different effectiveness tests.
- IPCC assessment can improve shared understanding but cannot settle distributional disputes, negotiate treaties or enforce emissions targets. UNFCCC parties make agreements and governments implement policy; the secretariat supports the process. Distinguish scientific authority from political and legal powers.
- Alternative obstacles include development priorities, historical responsibility, financial and technical capacity, measurement disputes and the tragedy of the commons. Sustainable development seeks accommodation; deep-green perspectives question whether shallow-green reform can address underlying patterns of production and consumption.
- NGOs and global civil society can expose abuses, supply expertise and mobilise public pressure in both areas, sometimes shifting incentives without coercion. Unequal resources, access and accountability can limit their influence; do not assume campaigning guarantees policy change.
- A substantiated judgement may treat sovereignty as the central institutional constraint but explain why capacity, power inequalities and distributional conflict determine when that constraint matters. Conversely, sovereignty can enable commitment and domestic implementation, so other obstacles may be judged more decisive. Credit other valid evidence and conclusions without requiring every example listed.