



EDX.CW7 Detente and Arms Control: SALT I and the Helsinki Agreement, 1969-75

EDEXCEL 1HI0 · Calculators not allowed · about 65 minutes

Total Marks

Name: _____ Date: ____ / ____ / ____

Answer ALL questions. Write in full sentences for Questions 15, 16 and 17. You are advised to spend about 65 minutes on this pack.

- 1** Give the name of the US president who pursued detente and negotiated SALT I with the USSR.

(Total for Question 1 is 1 mark)

- 2** Name the Soviet leader who signed SALT I with the United States in Moscow in 1972.

(Total for Question 2 is 1 mark)

- 3** State two reasons why both superpowers moved towards detente in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

(Total for Question 3 is 2 marks)

- 4** Give the year in which SALT I was signed in Moscow between the United States and the Soviet Union.

(Total for Question 4 is 1 mark)

- 5** Name one major element limited by SALT I in the 1972 agreements.

(Total for Question 5 is 1 mark)

6 State two things SALT I froze or limited relating to intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).

(Total for Question 6 is 2 marks)

7 Give the year in which the Helsinki Final Act was signed, concluding the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

(Total for Question 7 is 1 mark)

8 Name two of the parties that signed the Helsinki Agreement in 1975.

(Total for Question 8 is 2 marks)

9 State two practical effects SALT I had on the arms programmes of the USA and the USSR.

(Total for Question 9 is 2 marks)

10 Give the city and country where the Helsinki Final Act was signed in 1975.

(Total for Question 10 is 2 marks)

11 State one principle included in the Helsinki Agreement of 1975 relating to borders in Europe.

(Total for Question 11 is 2 marks)

- 12** State two commitments the Helsinki Agreement included relating to human rights and political freedoms.

(Total for Question 12 is 2 marks)

- 13** State two ways in which the high cost of the arms race pressured the USA and the USSR towards detente by the early 1970s.

(Total for Question 13 is 4 marks)

- 14** Give the international policy name used to describe the relaxation of tensions between the USA and USSR in this period, which Nixon pursued.

(Total for Question 14 is 1 mark)

- 15** Explain two consequences of the 1972 SALT I agreements for superpower relations and international security.

(Total for Question 15 is 8 marks)

16 Write a narrative account analysing how the memory of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the cost of the arms race helped push the USA and the USSR towards detente between 1969 and 1972.

You may use the following information in your answer:

- the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 and its impact on leaders perceptions of nuclear risk
- rising defence and missile development costs in the 1960s and their effect on national budgets

You should also use information of your own.

(Total for Question 16 is 8 marks)

17 Explain two of the following:

- (a) the importance of SALT I for reducing the immediate risk of nuclear confrontation
- (b) the importance of the Helsinki Agreement of 1975 for European security and cooperation
- (c) the importance of detente for superpower diplomacy in the early 1970s

You must answer on TWO parts.

(Total for Question 17 is 16 marks)

Mark scheme · EDX.CW7 Detente and Arms Control: SALT I and the Helsinki Agreement, 1969-75

Question 1

- **B1** Richard Nixon
- **Answer:** Richard Nixon

Question 2

- **B1** Leonid Brezhnev
- **Answer:** Leonid Brezhnev

Question 3

- **B1** the high economic cost of the arms race, which strained both countries budgets
- **B1** a shared desire to reduce the risk of nuclear war after crises such as the Cuban Missile Crisis
- **Answer:** The very high cost of the arms race, and a shared wish to reduce the risk of nuclear war after crises such as the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Question 4

- **B1** 1972
- **Answer:** 1972

Question 5

- **B1** anti-ballistic missile systems (ABMs)
- **Answer:** Anti-ballistic missile systems (ABMs)

Question 6

- **B1** it froze the number of ICBMs each side could deploy under the interim agreement
- **B1** it limited the deployment of new types or large increases in strategic offensive weapons without further negotiation
- **Answer:** SALT I froze the number of ICBMs each side held under the interim agreement, and limited deployment of new types or large increases in strategic offensive weapons without further negotiation.

Question 7

- **B1** 1975
- **Answer:** 1975

Question 8

- **B1** the Soviet Union (USSR)
- **B1** the United States of America
- **Answer:** The Soviet Union and the United States of America.

Question 9

- **B1** it slowed the further growth of strategic missile numbers by freezing holdings under the interim agreement
- **B1** it restricted the development of nationwide ABM defences by limiting ABM deployment to very small numbers of sites
- **Answer:** SALT I slowed growth of strategic missile numbers by freezing holdings, and restricted ABM deployment to a limited number of sites.

Question 10

- **B1** Helsinki
- **B1** Finland
- **Answer:** Helsinki, Finland

Question 11

- **B1** recognition of existing national borders in Europe
- **B1** a commitment by signatories not to seek to change those borders by force
- **Answer: Recognition of existing European borders, and a commitment not to change those borders by force.**

Question 12

- **B1** a pledge to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of thought and belief
- **B1** a commitment to cooperate in humanitarian and cultural exchanges that supported individual freedoms
- **Answer: A pledge to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of thought and belief, and commitments to cooperate in humanitarian and cultural exchanges.**

Question 13

- **B1** defence spending diverted resources from domestic priorities, creating political pressure for economies to be managed more carefully
- **B1** both superpowers faced rising costs to develop and maintain new generations of missiles and delivery systems
- **B1** economic strains made leaders more open to arms control as a means to cap spending and reduce the need for constant new investment
- **B1** costs of nuclear deterrence reduced the funds available for social programmes and economic modernisation, creating incentive to limit further escalation
- **Answer: Defence spending diverted resources from domestic needs and required cuts elsewhere; the cost of developing and maintaining missiles and delivery systems was growing; these economic strains made arms control attractive to cap spending; costly nuclear deterrence reduced funds for social and economic programmes.**

Question 14

- **B1** detente
- **Answer: Detente**

Question 15

- **Level 1** (1-2): Identifies one or two general consequences of SALT I with little or no supporting detail or explanation.
- **Level 2** (3-4): Identifies and begins to explain one consequence, supported by some accurate detail.
- **Level 3** (5-6): Explains two consequences of SALT I, each supported by accurate and relevant detail.
- **Level 4** (7-8): Explains two consequences in a well-developed, logically structured way, supported throughout by precise and accurate detail, showing how the consequences relate to wider superpower relations and security.
- **Indicative content:**
 - A direct consequence was a reduction in the rate of growth of strategic offensive weapons, since the interim agreement froze ICBM numbers, which reduced the immediate pressure on each side to add more missiles and eased tension over sudden arms expansion.
 - The ABM Treaty, limiting anti-ballistic missiles to a very small number of sites, reduced incentives to build full national missile defences, maintaining the balance of mutually assured destruction and thus stabilising deterrence in the short term.
 - SALT I increased diplomatic contact and trust-building between Washington and Moscow, creating mechanisms for verification and future talks, which made cooperation on other issues more likely while detente lasted.
 - However, by freezing rather than reducing arsenals SALT I also accepted the existence of large nuclear forces, so it stabilised rather than eliminated the underlying threat and left unresolved questions about qualitative improvements and new weapon types.

Question 16

- **Level 1** (1-2): Simple, generalised statements with little organisation or sense of change over time.
- **Level 2** (3-4): Some accurate knowledge is used and the answer shows limited organisation into a sequence; may be more a list of events than a narrative.
- **Level 3** (5-6): Organised and mostly coherent account showing some analysis of how perceptions and costs changed policy, with accurate supporting detail.
- **Level 4** (7-8): A coherent, well-organised narrative that analyses connections between events across the period and shows clearly how the Cuban crisis and the arms race costs pushed leaders towards detente, fully supported by precise and accurate detail.
- **Indicative content:**
 - Leaders on both sides remembered the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 as a close brush with nuclear war, which made the avoidance of direct confrontation and a reduction in the risk of nuclear accidents a high priority in later decision-making.
 - The crisis made political leaders, military planners and publics more aware of the destructive potential of superpower confrontation, creating a political environment in which negotiation and arms limitation appeared sensible and necessary.
 - Economic pressures in the 1960s, including expensive missile programmes and delivery systems, meant both countries had to weigh the opportunity cost of continued rapid expansion of nuclear arsenals against domestic economic needs.
 - In the USA, the Vietnam War also competed for resources, increasing the attractiveness of arms control to reduce defence spending pressures; in the USSR, economic limits on consumer and investment spending made leaders cautious about open-ended military competition.
 - These factors combined to create a policy window in which leaders such as Nixon and Brezhnev were willing to negotiate SALT I and related agreements as pragmatic ways to reduce risk and cap the most costly aspects of the arms race.

Question 17

- **Level 1** (1-4): For each part answered: identifies a general point of importance with little or no supporting detail or explanation.
- **Level 2** (5-8): For each part answered: begins to explain importance, supported by some accurate detail.
- **Level 3** (9-12): For each part answered: explains importance clearly, supported by accurate and relevant detail, with some analysis of consequences.
- **Level 4** (13-16): For each part answered: explains importance in a well-developed, analytical way, fully supported by precise and accurate detail, showing clearly why the development mattered for the outcome named.
- **Indicative content:**
 - (a) SALT I was important for reducing immediate risk because its ABM limits helped preserve mutual vulnerability, reducing incentives for a first-strike mentality and lowering the chances of sudden escalation; the interim freeze on ICBM numbers also slowed the pace of quantitative arms competition.
 - (b) The Helsinki Agreement was important for European security because it secured agreement from East and West to respect existing borders, which reduced the risk of interstate conflict in Europe, and because its human rights provisions created channels for cross-border contact and pressured governments on civil liberties, increasing long term cooperation.
 - (c) Detente was important for superpower diplomacy because it institutionalised regular summitry and negotiation, allowing both sides to manage crises more confidently, to open channels on trade and cultural exchange, and to use arms control as a bargaining tool in wider diplomacy.
 - A strong answer links the named importance to concrete consequences and evidence, for example the ABM Treaty as a specific mechanism under SALT I, the basket structure of Helsinki that combined security and human rights, or examples of summit diplomacy and resulting agreements under detente.