The Poverty Trap and the Equity-Efficiency Trade-Off in Redistribution - Worksheets, Questions and Revision
7 original exam-style questions - 3 pages of questions with a full mark scheme - free printable PDF.
The Poverty Trap and the Equity-Efficiency Trade-Off in Redistribution revision guideWrite-in editionMore A Level Economics practiceMock exams
This topic is chapter 4 of A Level Economics Topic Workbook 2 and chapter 18 of A Level Economics 10-Minute Tests 1.
1.19 The Poverty Trap and the Equity-Efficiency Trade-Off in Redistribution
Question 1
- sum deductions: 20% + 12% + 30% = 62% EMTRM1
- net extra disposable income = £1 - £0.62 = £0.38A1
- states that this reduces the disincentive compared with the original EMTR of 82%, since the household now keeps £0.38 rather than £0.18 of the extra £1B1
- Answer: New EMTR = 62%, net keep £0.38; this reduces the disincentive compared with the original EMTR of 82% (keeps £0.18).
Question 2
- Level 1 Basic statements using the data: identifies that Household B has a higher taper and therefore higher deductions, with limited or no quantitative comparison.1-3
- Level 2 Clear quantitative comparison: calculates EMTRs and net gains, and explains that Household B keeps less of each extra £1, reducing incentive to work.4-6
- Level 3 Detailed quantitative analysis and applied evaluation: computes EMTRs and net extra income for both households, explains behavioural implications for labour supply, and considers the broader context such as fixed costs of work or non-monetary factors.7-9
- Indicative content:
- Compute EMTR for Household A: 20% + 12% + 30% = 62%, net keep £0.38 of each extra £1
- Compute EMTR for Household B: 20% + 12% + 60% = 92%, net keep £0.08 of each extra £1
- Compare: Household B keeps 8p per extra £1, Household A keeps 38p, so B faces a much smaller marginal reward for extra work
- Behavioural implication: with only 8p net gain, B is less likely to increase hours, move to paid work, or accept overtime, compared with A
- Contextual evaluation: mention fixed costs such as childcare or transport which make tiny net gains especially unattractive, and note distributional fairness and fiscal cost considerations of reforms
Question 3
- Level 1 Basic and general statements about reducing withdrawal rates with limited analysis or development, little or no evaluation, and no clear judgement.1-5
- Level 2 Clear explanation of effects of lower withdrawal rates on EMTRs and incentives, some analysis of public cost or distributional consequences, limited evaluation of alternatives and tentative judgement.6-10
- Level 3 Well developed analysis with quantitative reasoning and reasoned evaluation: examines incentive effects, fiscal costs, equity-efficiency trade-offs, compares alternatives and offers a supported judgement that balances effectiveness, cost and fairness.11-15
- Level 4 Thorough and balanced evaluation that includes detailed analysis of behavioural responses, fiscal and administrative feasibility, distributional outcomes, likely magnitude of effects and possible unintended consequences; reaches a well-argued conclusion.16-20
- Level 5 Excellent evaluation: integrates quantitative examples (such as EMTR changes and likely net income gains), considers time lags, labour market heterogeneity, political and practical constraints, and provides a nuanced, evidence-based conclusion on whether lowering withdrawal rates is the best approach or part of a package.21-25
- Indicative content:
- Lowering taper rates reduces EMTRs and increases the net gain from extra earnings, directly improving work incentives for benefit recipients; example: reducing taper from 50% to 30% lowered EMTR from 82% to 62% in Questions 1 and 5
- Fiscal cost: lower withdrawal rates increase benefit outlays or reduce savings from withdrawals, requiring higher taxation or reallocation of spending; consider the budgetary trade-off
- Equity-efficiency trade-off: lower tapers improve incentives (efficiency) but may reduce progressivity if targeted poorly; discuss how lower tapers could be combined with higher top rates or alternative funding
- Alternatives: in-work subsidies or targeted tax credits increase net pay for workers without permanently raising benefit bills for non-workers; childcare support reduces fixed costs of work; training raises employability and earnings potential
- Universal basic income: removes tapering and simplifies administration but is costly and less targeted, with different incentive effects depending on design
- Behavioural and administrative issues: potential for people to game the system, stigma reduction with simpler schemes, and the importance of fixed costs which taper reduction alone may not address
- Magnitude and timing: supply-side policies like training take time; taper reduction can act quickly but may have limited impact if fixed costs remain large; assess which households are most affected
- Supported judgement could argue that reducing withdrawal rates is a useful and direct tool, but not necessarily the best sole policy; a package combining lower tapers with childcare, in-work support and training is likely more effective and cost-efficient
Question 4
- statement that the marginal rate of benefit withdrawal is the proportion of an extra pound of income that is lost due to reduced benefit entitlementB1
- explicit statement of units, e.g. a 50% taper means 50p of benefit is withdrawn for each extra pound earnedB1
- Answer: The marginal rate of benefit withdrawal is the percentage of each extra pound earned that is taken away by a reduction in means-tested benefits, for example a 50% taper withdraws 50p of benefit for every extra £1 of gross earnings.
Question 5
- 20% of £1 = £0.20 tax deductedM1
- 12% of £1 = £0.12 national insurance deductedM1
- 50% of £1 = £0.50 benefit withdrawnM1
- EMTR = 20%+12%+50% = 82%, net extra disposable income = £1 - £0.82 = £0.18A1
- Answer: Tax £0.20, NI £0.12, benefit withdrawal £0.50; total deductions £0.82, so EMTR = 82% and the household keeps £0.18 of the extra £1.
Question 6
- reason 1: means-tested benefits are designed to taper as earnings rise, so small increases from part-time to slightly-more hours can cause large benefit lossesM1
- development: part-time workers often cross thresholds where benefits withdraw quickly, so each additional hour reduces net income substantiallyA1
- reason 2: intermittent workers face fixed costs of work, such as childcare and travel, which make the net gain from extra hours smallerM1
- development: these fixed costs combined with high EMTRs can make additional paid hours financially unattractive for those with unstable hoursA1
- Answer: Part-time and intermittent workers often face rapid benefit withdrawal for small earnings increases, so small extra hours can cut benefits sharply and reduce net gains. They also incur fixed work-related costs like childcare and travel which further reduce the net benefit of extra hours, making them more susceptible to the poverty trap.
Question 7
- progressive income tax reduces after-tax returns to additional income, lowering the reward to saving from current incomeM1
- means-tested benefits may be withdrawn as assets or additional income rise, reducing the incentive to accumulate savingsM1
- combined effect: lower after-tax returns and risk of losing means-tested support make saving less attractive, reducing capital accumulation and long-run growth incentivesA1
- Answer: Progressive tax reduces the after-tax return on income, while means-tested benefits that are withdrawn when income or assets rise reduce the payoff from saving. Together they lower the incentive to build savings, which can reduce capital accumulation.
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