Price Discrimination and the Theory of Contestable Markets - Worksheets, Questions and Revision
7 original exam-style questions - 4 pages of questions with a full mark scheme - free printable PDF.
Price Discrimination and the Theory of Contestable Markets revision guideWrite-in editionMore A Level Economics practiceMock exams
This topic is chapter 2 of A Level Economics Topic Workbook 2 and chapter 16 of A Level Economics 10-Minute Tests 1.
1.17 Price Discrimination and the Theory of Contestable Markets
Question 1
- defines limit pricing: incumbent sets price low enough to make entry unprofitable for potential entrantsB1
- states strength: it can deter entry without permanent reduction of output, maintaining incumbent's market positionM1
- develops strength with example: in regional transport, below-peak fares or capacity discounts may remove short-run profit opportunity for entrantsA1
- states weakness: legal or regulatory scrutiny and commitment problems, and if entrants have lower costs or access to finance, limit pricing may not deter themB1
- Answer: Limit pricing is setting price low to make entry unprofitable. Strength: can deter entry and protect incumbent profits in the long run. Weakness: may be unsustainable or illegal, and entrants with low costs may still enter.
Question 2
- Level 1 Basic statements about contestability or consumer benefits, limited explanation, few or no examples, little structure.1-5
- Level 2 Some accurate description of contestable market theory and possible consumer benefits, limited analysis of assumptions or real-world frictions, few examples and limited judgement.6-10
- Level 3 Clear explanation of contestability features and implications for pricing and efficiency, analysis of sunk costs and other frictions with relevant examples, starts to evaluate trade-offs, partial judgement supported by evidence.11-15
- Level 4 Well-developed analysis of how contestability can benefit consumers through lower prices, efficiency and dynamic effects, balanced discussion of real-world limits such as sunk costs, regulation and capacity constraints, and good use of examples and diagrams.16-20
- Level 5 Comprehensive evaluation: detailed analysis of theory and evidence, thorough consideration of assumptions and frictions, balanced discussion of implications for pricing, short-run and long-run welfare, innovation and market structure, and a well-supported, justified conclusion connecting theory to empirical or realistic examples.21-25
- Indicative content:
- Definition of a contestable market: free entry and exit, absence of sunk costs, hit-and-run potential.
- How perfect contestability can force incumbents to price competitively, delivering allocative efficiency similar to perfect competition.
- Role of limit pricing as a deterrent and how contestability can discipline conduct without many firms present.
- Real-world frictions: presence of sunk costs, regulatory barriers, licensing, access to distribution or slot constraints in transport, which reduce contestability.
- Examples: regional transport where infrastructure and regulatory access create sunk costs and capacity constraints; retail where shelf space or branding creates barriers; digital platforms where network effects and data create de facto sunk cost or switching costs.
- Implications for consumers: potential lower prices and greater choice if contestability is high, but possible short-run losses if incumbents cut quality to deter entry.
- Dynamic effects: contestable markets may encourage innovation if incumbents fear entry, but large fixed costs may favour incumbents investing in quality and innovation instead.
- Distributional and welfare considerations: consumer surplus may rise but producer surplus may fall; potential for strategic behaviour and regulatory concern about predatory pricing.
- Diagrams that may be used: simple representation of incumbent setting limit price at competitive level, or AD/AS style diagram is not needed; explanation of diagram points and labels.
- Judgement: contestability can benefit consumers in ideal conditions, but in many real markets frictions mean benefits are limited or uneven; policy and regulation matter in making markets more contestable.
Question 3
- a firm charging different prices to different consumers or groups for the same product or serviceB1
- the price differences are not explained by differences in production costB1
- Answer: Charging different prices to different consumers or groups for the same good or service in a market such as rail or cinema, where the price differences are not due to differences in the cost of supply.
Question 4
- first-degree: charging each consumer their maximum willingness to pay, example given such as personalised auction or negotiated price for rare ticketsB1
- second-degree: price varies with quantity or version, example given such as bulk-buy discounts in retail or first-class versus standard-class rail tickets (versioning)B1
- third-degree: market split into groups with different elasticities, example given such as student or senior discounts in cinemas or trainsB1
- each example states which consumers pay more and which pay less and whyB1
- one development point linking the degree to how it can increase firm profit or affect consumer welfare in the exampleB1
- clear labelling of each degree as first, second or thirdB1
- Answer: First-degree: personalised pricing such as auctions where each buyer pays their maximum willingness to pay. Second-degree: bulk discounts or first-class versus standard-class tickets where price varies by quantity or version sold. Third-degree: segmentation into groups with different price elasticities, e.g. student discounts for cinema tickets or peak commuter fares, where less elastic groups pay more.
Question 5
- states the pricing rule: markup (P - MC)/P = -1/elasticity or price should be higher where demand is less elasticM1
- applies rule qualitatively: since adult elasticity -0.8 is less elastic than student elasticity -1.6, adults should face a higher price relative to MC than studentsA1
- notes assumption: marginal cost is similar across groups so differences in price reflect differing elasticitiesM1
- concludes that charging adults £10 and students £7 fits the rule that the less elastic group (adults) pays a higher priceA1
- optional numeric demonstration: rearrange rule to show P/(P - MC) = -elasticity and note relative ratios without needing MC valueM1
- states implication: with elasticities -0.8 and -1.6, the adult group can bear a larger markup, so P_adult > P_student is appropriateA1
- recognises caveat: other constraints such as preventing resale or legal restrictions or signalling may affect pricingB1
- clear concluding sentence linking elasticity differences to the observed price differentialB1
- Answer: Rule: (P - MC)/P = -1/elasticity, so less elastic demand supports a higher markup. With adult elasticity -0.8 and student -1.6, adults should face a higher price than students, so £10 v £7 is consistent with optimal third-degree discrimination given similar MCs, subject to resale prevention and other constraints.
Question 6
- identifies perfect contestability features: absence of sunk costs, free entry and exit, and access to the same technology for entrantsM1
- explains hit-and-run entry: potential entrants can enter when incumbents price above competitive level, make profit, and exit without lossA1
- links sunk costs: if sunk costs are zero entrants can exit without loss, making the market contestableM1
- implication for incumbents: they may set a price close to competitive price to deter entry, for example using limit pricingA1
- Answer: Perfect contestability requires zero sunk costs, free entry and exit and equal access to technology; hit-and-run entry means entrants can exploit temporary supernormal profit and exit; therefore incumbents may set prices close to competitive levels to deter entry.
Question 7
- identifies reason 1: increase total revenue by charging higher prices to less elastic groups (commuters) and lower prices to more elastic groups (students, leisure)M1
- develops with mechanism: additional sales in the elastic segment may increase total profits if marginal cost is low for extra seatsA1
- identifies reason 2: capacity utilisation - off-peak discounts increase usage of otherwise empty seats, spreading fixed costsM1
- develops with mechanism: higher utilisation lowers average costs, improving profitability and consumer optionsA1
- identifies reason 3: competitive and strategic reasons, e.g. deter entry on peak routes or segment particular customers to reduce poachingM1
- develops with evaluation: may reduce scope for entrants if prices are tailored to remove profit opportunities, but could invite regulatory scrutinyA1
- provides brief counterpoint: administration costs, risk of arbitrage/resale, or customer resentment may limit gainsB1
- concluding judgement weighing benefits against costs and constraints, e.g. likely profitable if resale prevented and marginal costs lowB1
- Answer: BritRail may price-discriminate to increase revenue from less elastic commuters while filling spare capacity with off-peak discounts, and for strategic deterrence; these raise profit but are limited by resale risks, administrative costs and regulation.
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