Externalities: Negative and Positive Production and Consumption Effects - Worksheets, Questions and Revision
10 original exam-style questions - 4 pages of questions with a full mark scheme - free printable PDF.
Externalities: Negative and Positive Production and Consumption Effects revision guideWrite-in editionMore A Level Economics practiceMock exams
This topic is chapter 9 of A Level Economics Topic Workbook 2 and chapter 23 of A Level Economics 10-Minute Tests 1.
1.24 Externalities: Negative and Positive Production and Consumption Effects
Question 1
- MSC = MPC + marginal external cost = 8 + 2M1
- MSC = £10 per unitA1
- Pigovian tax should equal the marginal external cost to internalise the externalityM1
- Pigovian tax = £2 per unitA1
- Answer: MSC = £10 per unit; Pigovian tax = £2 per unit.
Question 2
- MPC is the additional cost to the firm of producing one more unit, including private inputs and operating costsB1
- MSC equals MPC plus the external cost imposed on third parties, such as health and cleaning costs from dust pollutionB1
- Answer: MPC is the firm's extra cost of producing one more brick; MSC is MPC plus the external costs borne by nearby households, for example higher cleaning and health costs from dust.
Question 3
- MPB is the benefit to the individual consumer from consuming one more unit, e.g. reduced own risk of illness from the vaccineB1
- MSB equals MPB plus external benefits to others, so when vaccines produce positive consumption externalities MSB > MPBB1
- Answer: MPB is the private benefit to the vaccinated person; MSB is MPB plus benefits to others (reduced transmission), so MSB is larger than MPB when vaccines give positive externalities.
Question 4
- correctly defines externalities as external costs and benefits that affect third parties, captured by the MPC/MSC and MPB/MSB distinctionsM1
- explains that information failures concern imperfect or asymmetric information between market participants, a different market-failure mechanismA1
- gives a concrete example of interaction, e.g. consumers underestimating vaccine benefits could mean subsidies are less effective because demand remains low, so information campaigns may complement subsidiesM1
- explains the interaction briefly, e.g. without good information the shift from MPB to MSB via subsidy may be smaller than expectedA1
- notes that information failure is a distinct market failure that can nonetheless interact with an externalityB1
- concludes with a short policy implication, e.g. combining information provision with subsidy can be more cost effectiveB1
- Answer: Externalities are external costs and benefits affecting third parties, captured by MPC/MSC and MPB/MSB; information failures are about imperfect knowledge, a distinct market-failure mechanism, but the two can interact, for example if people underestimate vaccine benefits then subsidies alone may not shift demand to the social optimum and information campaigns are needed alongside subsidies.
Question 5
- states that MSB > MPB for education because there are wider benefits such as higher productivity and lower crimeM1
- explains that a subsidy shifts MPB toward MSB, increasing consumption of education towards the social optimumA1
- gives one drawback, e.g. fiscal cost to the government, risk of deadweight loss if subsidy is poorly targeted, or displacement of private provisionB1
- Answer: MSB exceeds MPB for education because others benefit from higher skills; a subsidy raises private take-up towards the socially optimal level, but it has fiscal costs and risks being poorly targeted.
Question 6
- calculates MSC = MPC + external cost = 7 + 3 = £10M1
- states that if demand is perfectly elastic at £10 and equilibrium without intervention is at price £10 and Q = 100, then setting price equal to MSC keeps quantity at 100A1
- identifies the Pigovian tax equals marginal external cost = £3 per unitM1
- states socially optimal price is £10 and quantity Qs = 100 under these assumptionsA1
- explains briefly that the tax raises private supply cost to MSC, internalising the externality so firms face the social cost when deciding outputB1
- notes limitation: real demand is rarely perfectly elastic, so in practice quantity would change and the calculation is a simplificationB1
- Answer: MSC = £10, so socially optimal price = £10 and quantity remains 100 under the perfect elasticity assumption; Pigovian tax = £3 per unit.
Question 7
- identifies a plausible limitation, for example the practical difficulty of measuring the true marginal external cost per unit of outputM1
- explains the consequence, e.g. if the tax is set too low the externality is not corrected, if too high it creates excessive firm costs and deadweight lossA1
- offers a further developed evaluative point, for example political resistance or administrative costs may make precise Pigovian taxes impractical and reduce net welfare gainsB1
- Answer: Measuring the true marginal external cost is difficult, so a tax set incorrectly may under- or over-correct; additionally political and administrative costs can reduce the net welfare benefit.
Question 8
- identifies that a subsidy to buyers increases the private benefit at each quantity, shifting MPB rightwards towards MSB by the subsidy amountM1
- applies the numerical subsidy: MPB increases by £5 per doseM1
- shows the initial equilibrium Q1 = 40 where original MPB = supply (or price)M1
- shows the new equilibrium Q2 = 60 where MPB + subsidy = supply, hence increased quantityM1
- calculates the change in quantity as Q2 - Q1 = 20 dosesA1
- explains that the subsidy reduces the private price paid or increases perceived benefit, encouraging more consumption towards the social optimumA1
- notes a limitation, for example subsidy cost to the government or risk of overconsumption if MSB is overestimatedB1
- concludes that the subsidy can increase consumption to a level closer to social optimum by internalising external benefitsB1
- Answer: A £5 subsidy shifts MPB right by £5, moving equilibrium from 40 to 60 doses, an increase of 20 doses. The subsidy internalises external benefits but has budgetary costs and requires correct sizing.
Question 9
- identifies an unintended consequence, e.g. permit markets can lead to permit price volatility or concentration of permits among larger firmsM1
- explains how concentration could occur: larger firms can buy permits and expand output while smaller firms are forced to exit, reducing competitionA1
- offers a second consequence or elaboration, e.g. if permit prices rise unexpectedly costs are passed to consumers or firms may relocate production outside the urban area, shifting pollution rather than reducing itM1
- explains the welfare implication, e.g. potential loss of local jobs, higher consumer prices, or 'leakage' of pollution to other locationsA1
- Answer: Tradable permits can concentrate permits with large firms, harming competition, and permit price volatility can raise costs or push firms to relocate, shifting pollution rather than eliminating it.
Question 10
- Level 1 Basic points about externalities and possible interventions, limited development, little or no use of diagrammatic reasoning, judgement absent or unsupported.1-5
- Level 2 Clear explanation of how intervention (e.g. Pigovian tax, regulation, permits) could correct the externality, with some evaluation of alternatives and practical constraints, partial diagram use and a tentative conclusion.6-10
- Level 3 Detailed analysis of multiple policy options with diagrams, evaluation of measurement, enforcement and distributional issues, consideration of second-best or complementary policies, and a well-supported final judgement.11-15
- Indicative content:
- Explain how a negative production externality leads to MSC > MPC and market overproduction, with reference to a MPC/MSC diagram and the welfare loss triangle.
- Analyse Pigovian taxes: how a tax equal to marginal external cost can internalise the externality and restore the social optimum; discuss measurement difficulties in estimating marginal external cost and administrative costs of applying the tax.
- Consider regulation and technology standards: how emission limits or required filters can reduce emissions; discuss monitoring/enforcement costs and potential for firms to pass costs to consumers or relocate.
- Discuss tradable permits: how cap-and-trade sets a clear emissions cap and allows cost-effective reductions; evaluate permit market volatility, initial allocation consequences and potential for market concentration.
- Consider negotiation and Coasean solutions: where property rights are clear and transaction costs low, bargaining between brickworks and residents might achieve efficient outcomes without government action; assess the realism given many affected households and high transaction costs.
- Evaluate distributional and political economy issues: who bears costs of intervention, potential job losses, impact on housing prices and local businesses, and acceptability of policies.
- Consider complementary measures: combining subsidies for cleaner technology, information provision, or relocation support to affected households to increase acceptability and efficiency.
- Conclude with a balanced judgement: government intervention is often justified when transaction costs prevent bargaining and when external costs are significant, but the choice of instrument must consider measurement, enforcement, cost effectiveness and fairness; a mix of regulation and market-based measures, possibly with targeted compensation, may be best.
Mark your answers
Check answers without an account. Some answers can be checked automatically; use the mark scheme to mark the rest.