Asymmetric Information, Merit Goods and Demerit Goods - Worksheets, Questions and Revision
12 original exam-style questions - 3 pages of questions with a full mark scheme - free printable PDF.
Asymmetric Information, Merit Goods and Demerit Goods revision guideWrite-in editionMore A Level Economics practiceMock exams
This topic is chapter 10 of A Level Economics Topic Workbook 2 and chapter 24 of A Level Economics 10-Minute Tests 1.
1.25 Asymmetric Information, Merit Goods and Demerit Goods
Question 1
- a situation where one party to a transaction has more or better information than the other partyB1
- typically sellers have more information about product quality, or buyers about their own risk, depending on the marketB1
- Answer: Asymmetric information is where one side of a market transaction has better information than the other; for example sellers often know more about product quality than buyers.
Question 2
- adverse selection occurs when higher risk individuals are more likely to buy insurance than lower risk individualsB1
- the causal mechanism is that insurers cannot perfectly observe buyers' risk before the contract, so premiums rise and low-risk buyers withdrawB1
- Answer: Adverse selection is when higher-risk individuals are more likely to purchase insurance because insurers cannot identify risk perfectly, which can raise premiums and drive out low-risk customers.
Question 3
- moral hazard is when a person changes behaviour after obtaining insurance or a contract because they no longer bear the full cost of risky actionsB1
- example: a driver with comprehensive car insurance driving less carefully because repairs are coveredB1
- Answer: Moral hazard is when insured individuals take greater risks because they are protected from the full cost; for example, a driver may be less careful after buying comprehensive car insurance.
Question 4
- a merit good is one that has greater long-term private and social benefits than consumers recogniseB1
- markets under-consume education because individuals may underestimate future benefits or face liquidity constraints, so private demand is below the socially desirable levelB1
- Answer: A merit good yields greater private and social benefits than consumers appreciate; for example education is under-consumed because people may undervalue long-term returns or lack funds to invest.
Question 5
- a demerit good is consumed more than is socially desirable because consumers under-estimate its private costs or ignore negative externalitiesB1
- example: tobacco may be over-consumed because consumers under-estimate health risks or suffer addiction, reducing rational decision-makingB1
- Answer: A demerit good is over-consumed because people under-estimate private costs or ignore harms; tobacco is over-consumed since users may underestimate health risks or be addicted.
Question 6
- subsidies to reduce the private price, increasing consumptionB1
- information campaigns or mandatory vaccination policies to increase private perceived benefits or uptakeB1
- Answer: Examples: subsidies to lower cost; information campaigns or mandates to raise uptake.
Question 7
- consumers may under-estimate private costs or over-estimate private benefits because of imperfect information, for example overestimating the chance of winning in gamblingM1
- this leads to higher private demand than if probabilities and long-term losses were fully understood, causing overconsumption relative to the social optimumA1
- evaluation: addiction and behavioural biases reduce the effectiveness of information alone, so information campaigns may be insufficient without complementary policiesA1
- Answer: Imperfect information, such as overestimating winning odds, raises private demand for gambling above the socially desirable level; however, addiction and biases mean information alone may not correct overconsumption.
Question 8
- private benefits are gains accruing to the individual, such as higher wages or better job prospectsB1
- social benefits include wider gains to society, e.g. higher productivity, lower crime, and positive externalities from a more skilled workforceB1
- example: an individual may gain a 20% higher lifetime income from a degree (private benefit), while society benefits from higher tax revenues and reduced unemployment (social benefits)B1
- Answer: Private benefits are the individual's higher earnings and opportunities; social benefits include wider productivity and social gains. For instance, a graduate may earn 20% more (private gain), while society gains higher tax receipts and lower crime rates (social gains).
Question 9
- adverse selection occurs BEFORE a transaction, when hidden characteristics lead to a disproportionate number of high-risk buyers or low-quality goods entering the marketB1
- moral hazard occurs AFTER a transaction, when the insured or contracted party changes behaviour because they no longer face the full consequences of riskB1
- adverse selection is about hidden information about inherent characteristics, moral hazard is about hidden actions or behaviour once a contract is in forceB1
- Answer: Adverse selection occurs before a contract, when those with hidden high risk are more likely to buy insurance; moral hazard occurs after a contract, when insured people take more risks because they do not bear full costs. The former is hidden characteristics, the latter hidden actions.
Question 10
- signalling is an action by the informed party to reveal private information, e.g. obtaining a degree signals higher ability or productivityB1
- this reduces adverse selection because employers use the signal to differentiate higher-ability candidates from lower-ability ones, improving the match in the marketB1
- Answer: A degree acts as a signal of ability that helps employers distinguish higher-productivity graduates, reducing adverse selection by revealing private information.
Question 11
- screening is where the uninformed party takes actions to elicit information, e.g. insurers require health questionnaires or medical checksB1
- this reduces adverse selection because insurers can better price risk or refuse very high risks, improving the risk pool and preventing premiums from rising excessivelyB1
- Answer: Insurers screen applicants with questionnaires or checks to reveal risk characteristics, enabling better pricing or exclusion and so reducing adverse selection.
Question 12
- Level 1 Basic identification of imperfect information and a simple link to under-consumption or a single policy. Limited development and little use of economic reasoning or real-world connection.1-4
- Level 2 Clear explanation of how imperfect information about vaccinations reduces private demand and creates a divergence between private and social benefits, with discussion of the resulting inefficient allocation and some evaluation of policy responses.5-8
- Level 3 Sophisticated analysis linking information failure to measurable market failure for vaccinations, including mechanisms (e.g. under-estimation of herd immunity benefits, present bias), effects on equilibrium quantity and welfare, and balanced evaluation of policy tools and their limitations.9-12
- Indicative content:
- Name the merit good: vaccinations, which produce private protection and positive externalities via herd immunity
- Explain imperfect information: individuals may underestimate long-term benefits, misunderstand small probabilities of adverse effects, or be unaware of herd immunity benefits to others
- Mechanisms: uncertainty about vaccine safety or effectiveness reduces perceived private benefit, present bias leads to undervaluing future health gains, and information problems shift private demand left of the social demand curve
- Allocation consequence: market equilibrium quantity is below the socially optimal quantity, producing a deadweight loss and higher risk of disease outbreaks
- Distributional/behavioural aspects: vaccine hesitancy can be concentrated in particular groups, increasing localised outbreaks and social costs
- Policy responses: subsidies or free provision to remove price barriers, information campaigns to correct misperceptions, mandates or conditional requirements (e.g. school-entry vaccination), and provision by trusted public health bodies to signal safety
- Evaluation of policies: information campaigns may be limited by entrenched beliefs and misinformation; subsidies improve uptake but may not address hesitancy; mandates increase coverage but raise ethical and political objections and may have enforcement costs
- Second-best considerations: combination policies (information plus subsidies or targeted mandates) can be more effective; consider timing and costs, and potential unintended consequences such as reduced trust if policies are heavy-handed
- Consider magnitude and externalities: the size of the positive externality (how contagious the disease is) affects the case for intervention; when herd immunity thresholds are high, the welfare gain from reaching the social optimum is larger
- Conclude with a balanced judgement on why imperfect information causes market failure for vaccinations and how policy can mitigate but not always fully eliminate the problem
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