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GCSE · History

EDX.CW8 The Collapse of Detente: SALT II and the Invasion of Afghanistan, 1979

EDEXCEL 1HI0 · Calculators not allowed · about 65 minutes

Total Marks

Name: _______________________________ Date: ____ / ____ / ______

Answer ALL questions. Write in full sentences for Questions 15, 16 and 17. You are advised to spend about 65 minutes on this pack.

Give the year in which the SALT II agreement was signed by the United States and the Soviet Union.

(Total for Question 1 is 1 mark)

Name the US president who negotiated SALT II.

(Total for Question 2 is 1 mark)

Give the name used for the Soviet medium-range missiles deployed in Europe in the late 1970s that worried NATO governments.

(Total for Question 3 is 1 mark)

State two features of the SALT II treaty limits.

(Total for Question 4 is 2 marks)

Name the Afghan leader whose government was a factor in the Soviet decision to invade Afghanistan in December 1979.

(Total for Question 5 is 1 mark)

Give one reason why US senators decided not to ratify SALT II after it was signed.

(Total for Question 6 is 1 mark)

State two US concerns about the Soviet Union in the late 1970s that fed suspicion of Soviet intentions.

(Total for Question 7 is 2 marks)

Name one prominent US and Western diplomatic response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan that signalled a harder line, separate from SALT II ratification.

(Total for Question 8 is 1 mark)

Give the name of the NATO policy, decided in 1979, which combined deployment of Western missiles with an offer to negotiate limits on Soviet SS-20s.

(Total for Question 9 is 1 mark)

Give the city where the SALT II agreement was signed in June 1979 by President Carter and General Secretary Brezhnev.

(Total for Question 10 is 1 mark)

Name the Afghan communist party with which Hafizullah Amin was associated when he took power in 1979.

(Total for Question 11 is 1 mark)

State one internal condition in Afghanistan in 1979 that made Soviet leaders worry about the stability of the Amin government.

(Total for Question 12 is 1 mark)

Give the month in 1979 when Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan.

(Total for Question 13 is 1 mark)

State one Soviet strategic concern about Afghanistan that made Moscow view a pro-Western government there as unacceptable.

(Total for Question 14 is 1 mark)

Explain two consequences of the US Senate not ratifying the SALT II agreement after it was signed in 1979. You should explain the effects this decision had on the state of detente and superpower relations in the late 1970s and very early 1980s.

(Total for Question 15 is 8 marks)

Write a narrative account analysing how the deployment of SS-20 missiles and growing US concerns about Soviet behaviour contributed to the breakdown of detente between 1977 and the end of 1979.

You may use the following information in your answer:
- the deployment of SS-20 missiles to sites able to strike Western Europe
- growing US concern over Soviet human rights abuses and other aggressive actions, including events in 1979

You should also use information of your own.

(Total for Question 16 is 8 marks)

Explain two of the following:
(a) the importance of the SS-20 missile deployments for NATO decision-making in 1979
(b) the importance of Soviet fears about the Hafizullah Amin government for the Soviet decision to invade Afghanistan in December 1979
(c) the importance of US domestic politics, including Congressional and public opinion, for the failure to ratify SALT II

You must answer on TWO parts.

(Total for Question 17 is 16 marks)

Mark scheme · EDX.CW8 The Collapse of Detente: SALT II and the Invasion of Afghanistan, 1979

Question 1

B1 1979
Answer: 1979

Question 2

B1 Jimmy Carter
Answer: President Jimmy Carter

Question 3

B1 SS-20
Answer: SS-20

Question 4

B1 sets limits on the number of strategic launchers and delivery systems
B1 included restrictions on new strategic weapons such as MIRVed missiles and certain types of submarine-launched missiles
Answer: SALT II placed limits on the number of strategic launchers and delivery systems, and it restricted certain new strategic weapons such as MIRVed missiles and some submarine-launched systems.

Question 5

B1 Hafizullah Amin
Answer: Hafizullah Amin

Question 6

B1 the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979
Answer: Because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979.

Question 7

B1 deployment of SS-20 missiles in Eastern Europe
B1 reports of Soviet human rights abuses and treatment of dissidents
Answer: The deployment of SS-20 missiles in Eastern Europe, and concerns about Soviet human rights abuses and treatment of dissidents.

Question 8

B1 the US-led boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics
Answer: The US-led boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics

Question 9

B1 the dual-track decision
Answer: The dual-track decision

Question 10

B1 Vienna
Answer: Vienna

Question 11

B1 the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA)
Answer: The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, the PDPA

Question 12

B1 political instability and violent factional rivalry within the PDPA
Answer: Political instability and violent factional rivalry within the PDPA

Question 13

B1 December
Answer: December 1979

Question 14

B1 fear that a pro-Western Afghanistan would allow US influence close to Soviet Central Asian borders
Answer: Soviet fear that a pro-Western Afghanistan would allow US influence close to Soviet Central Asian borders

Question 15

Level 1 (1-2): Identifies one or two simple consequences of the non-ratification, with little or no supporting detail.
Level 2 (3-4): Identifies and begins to explain one consequence, supported by some accurate detail about detente or relations.
Level 3 (5-6): Explains two consequences of the non-ratification, each supported by accurate and relevant detail showing effects on detente and relations.
Level 4 (7-8): Explains two consequences in a well-developed and linked way, supported throughout by precise detail, showing how the non-ratification worsened distrust and affected subsequent policies.
Indicative content:
- It undermined trust and the political basis of detente, since the failure to ratify a signed arms control treaty signalled that the United States might not honour negotiated limits, encouraging the Soviets to doubt US commitment to arms control.
- The non-ratification hardened US policy and public opinion, making administrations and Congress more willing to take a stronger stance, for example increasing defence spending and supporting NATO measures such as the dual-track decision, reducing the space for cooperative diplomacy.
- It contributed to an arms control stalemate, since a major treaty agreed at summit level was left unratified and future negotiations became more difficult in an atmosphere of mutual suspicion.
- The decision fuelled Soviet propaganda that the West was unreliable, and this helped justify to Soviet leaders a more robust security posture, including reinforcing their influence in neighbouring regions such as Afghanistan.

Question 16

Level 1 (1-2): Simple, generalised statements with little organisation or sequence; limited explanation of how events are connected.
Level 2 (3-4): Some accurate knowledge presented in a basic sequence; begins to show how SS-20 deployments and US concerns affected detente.
Level 3 (5-6): A coherent narrative that explains the sequence of events and analyses connections between deployments, US reactions and political developments, supported by accurate detail.
Level 4 (7-8): A well-structured, detailed narrative that analyses how the SS-20 deployments and rising US concerns combined to erode trust, influenced NATO and US policy, and prepared the ground for a decisive breakdown in detente by the end of 1979.
Indicative content:
- From the mid-to-late 1970s the Soviet deployment of SS-20 mobile medium-range missiles across its western areas alarmed NATO because these systems could strike western European capitals with multiple warheads, upsetting the strategic balance that arms control aimed to stabilise.
- Western concern about SS-20s fed directly into NATO debates and led to the 1979 dual-track decision that combined a threat to deploy Western intermediate-range missiles with an offer to negotiate limits, a sign that confidence in arms control had weakened.
- At the same time, US concerns about Soviet human rights abuses and the treatment of dissidents undermined public and Congressional support for close cooperation, and incidents in 1979, especially the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, crystallised the impression that Moscow was prepared to use force abroad.
- The combination of a visible Soviet military build-up in Europe and growing moral and political opposition to Soviet behaviour in the United States narrowed the room for diplomatic compromise, leading to the effective collapse of detente by the end of 1979.

Question 17

Level 1 (1-4): For each part answered: identifies a general reason why the factor mattered, with little or no supporting detail or explanation.
Level 2 (5-8): For each part answered: begins to explain importance, supported by some accurate detail and a basic link to actions taken in 1979.
Level 3 (9-12): For each part answered: explains importance clearly, supported by accurate and relevant detail, and shows how the factor influenced specific decisions or events.
Level 4 (13-16): For each part answered: explains importance in a well-developed, analytical way, fully supported by precise and accurate detail, and shows clearly why the factor was decisive for the outcome named.
Indicative content:
- (a) SS-20 deployments were important because they directly threatened Western Europe and forced NATO to respond; their range and mobility changed the perceived balance and led to the 1979 dual-track decision, showing how a Soviet weapons programme could drive allied strategy and reduce confidence in arms control.
- (b) Soviet fears about Amin were important because Soviet leaders worried a volatile, possibly pro-Western Afghan regime on their southern border threatened their influence in Central Asia and could encourage instability among Muslim populations within Soviet republics; these fears helped justify the decision to use direct military intervention in December 1979.
- (c) US domestic politics were important because Congressional opposition and public concern about Soviet behaviour, especially over human rights and after Afghanistan, made it politically impossible for American presidents to get ratification; the Senate refusal to act undermined SALT II and signalled that US domestic opinion constrained foreign policy choices.

The Collapse of Detente: SALT II and the Invasion of Afghanistan, 1979 - Worksheets, Questions and Revision